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In this paper I will be discussing means through which non-representational imagery in 
dance, and in particular in dance-related activities such as digital choreography, can be 
understood.  I argue that, although movement that has representational content might 
have a meaning that can be translated into words (through a verbal interpretation of the 
meaning of gestures, relationships of dancers on the stage, and other features), more 
nuanced interpretations of the movement are understood through an embodied 
understanding of their more detailed subtleties. I further argue that non-representational 
movement, which does not pretend to represent anything, can communicate other types 
of understanding as one engages in the act of viewing the movement of dancers, and 
more particularly in this paper, digital imagery that uses human movement as its source.  
The artistic focus of rigorously non-representational dance works such as those 
prevalent in the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s (for example the work of Merce Cunningham, 
Kenneth King and Lucinda Childs1) was on an interrogation of formal aspects of the 
choreographic art for their own sake, rather than through their use as a vehicle through 
which to articulate narrative or emotion. The works that resulted led to a developing 
understanding that the choreographic art could be a formalist, as well as an expressive, 
endeavour. Other forms of non-representational dance work (for example the work of 
American postmodern choreographers such as Yvonne Rainer, Steve Paxton, Simone 
Forti and, later, British choreographers Rosemary Butcher and Siobhan Davies2) 
focused on a choreographic exploration of the intricacies of the detail of the movement 
of human bodies as they move, and dance. Whilst expressive content in the movement 
often emerged as a result of this exploration this was not the intention of their works.  
In Britain this kind of choreographic focus extended its remit to generate works that have 
an emotional resonance. They did not, however, represent emotional states. In order to 
understand the nuances of ‘meaning’ inherent within the movement and the 
interrelationships between the dancers this kind of work requires audience members to 
attend as much to the sensations of their biological and physiological systems as to the 
gestural images before them.  It is through this, our affective response to the motions of 
the dancer, that we reach an understanding of the works, rather than through an 
interpretation of the meaning of the movement of the dancers in more narrative terms.                                                           
1 www.merce.org, www.www.lucindachilds.com 
2 www.rosemarybutcher.com, www.siobhandavies.com  
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This claim that our understanding of dance and choreography goes beyond 
interpretation of an identifiable emotional state or narrative is by no means original. As 
long ago as 1933, John Martin forwarded the notion that metakinesis3 is the means 
through which we understand dance.  Martin (1933) argued that metakinesis is sited in 
the physiological responses of the viewer to the dancer/s, a process he refers to as 
muscular or kinaesthetic sympathy. He noted that when seeing movements that 
represent an action with which one is familiar  
“…you have no difficulty in following their meaning because you have often 
done them yourself … instantaneously, through a sympathetic muscular 
memory you associate the movement with its purpose.” (ibid.p.12).  
  
He goes further, suggesting not only that that movement is ‘…the link between the 
dancer’s intention and your perception of it” (ibid.) but also that it is “…a medium for the 
transference of an aesthetic and emotional concept from the consciousness of one 
individual to that of another” [ibid. p.13). ‘Metakinesis’ describes a psychic4 process that 
is correlated with physical action, a concept that is that is grounded in the theory that 
“the physical and the psychical are merely two aspects of an underlying reality” (ibid.). 
Martin’s analysis of the concept of metakinesis became more sophisticated in 1939 
(Martin 1939, pp.42-54], although he appears to abandoned the use of the term in these 
later writings. As will be seen, his intuitive understandings of the way in which we 
understand dance have proved to be prescient. 
 Unfortunately Martin’s position became not merely unpopular but considered irrelevant 
to dance analysis in the 1980s. At this time a primarily structural mode of analysis began 
to dominate (which in Britain found its apotheosis in a book entitled ‘Dance Analysis’ 
(Adshead et al., 1988/1994) eventually published in 1988. During the 1980s dance 
analysis had become a systematic exercise in unpicking the features of dance from the 
gestalt of the work (for example, observing the fine detail of movements both spatially 
and eukinetically, the use of time and space in a dance, the number and gender of 
dancers, relationships between dancers, sound, visual design, costuming, and so on) in 
order to develop and/or interpret meaning/s of the dance from a conscious 
understanding of these features.  Whilst such analysis still has a place in understanding 
theatre dance, it by no means tells the whole story.  Indeed, even then there was a 
sense that something was missing in this, more objective, mode of approaching an 
understanding of dances.  In America a shift in the study of dance was taking place. 
Dance academics began to examine dance works from a socio-political and cultural 
perspective, supplementing a more structural analysis of dance with a socio-political 
contextual framework encompassing issues addressed by post-structuralist and cultural 
                                                        
3 Martin (1933. p. 13) found the term metakinesis in an ‘obscure footnote in Webster’s Dictionary.  
4 The term psychic was used at this time to mean ‘that which pertains to the mind’.  
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studies (Foster 1986)5. This position was later embraced by Adshead and other British 
academics (Burt, 1995, Adshead 1999, Briginshaw, 2001). It remains a dominant mode 
of dance analysis in the early 21st century.  
Recently, however, Martin’s position concerning processes through which we 
understand dance has begun to experience a resurgence of interest amongst dance 
scholars6.  During the course of the last two decades Martin’s intuited notion of 
‘metakinesis’ has been vindicated by neuroscientists.  The operation of the Mirror 
Neuron System, discovered by Vittorio Gallese and his colleagues at the University of 
Parma in the mid-1990s (Gallese 1996, 1998), bears an uncanny resemblance to the 
claims made by Martin in the quotation on p.2.  
The Mirror Neuron System is directly related to action, both active and observed.  This 
discovery implicitly acknowledges the role played by ‘metakinesis’ (now referred to as 
embodied cognition) in the communication of ‘meaning’ through movement.  This kind of 
‘meaning’, however, is not one that is easily translated into words, for, rather than the 
movement necessarily being representative of something outside of itself, a  ‘sign’ for 
some other concept or feature, neuroscientists argue that it can also be intrinsically 
‘meaningful’.  In neuro-scientific parlance the movement itself resonates with our 
‘primary’ or ‘core’ consciousness, that level of consciousness that lies below reflective or 
‘extended’ consciousness7.  The former underpins what Deleuze and Guattari (after 
Spinoza) call ‘affect’.    
It is evident that we do not always pay sufficient attention to these more subtle  modes of 
consciousness, taking for granted the sensations that we feel, but barely notice, as we 
experience movement vicariously.  This is unfortunate as I would suggest that it is this 
that gives rise to that intuitive understanding of movement phenomena that resist being 
reduced to verbal interpretation, whether that movement is live, or a recorded 
representation.  In this paper, I will suggest that non-representational digital 
choreography grounded in a choreographic sensibility that is permeated by the principles 
of Release Techniques8 provides an interesting arena though which to unpack this 
notion. Non-representational imagery such as that shown in Figure 1 does not represent 
a physical image of the material, fleshly dancer, rather it presents images that simulate 
flows of sensation that might be experienced by dancers as they move.   
                                                        
5 Naomi Jackson shows that the two writers share certain concerns, but that Foster begins to site 
dance in the post-strucutralist rather than analytic philsopical tradition  
6 A 3-year research project, funded by UK’s Arts & Humanities Research Council, “Watching 
Dance: Kinaesethic Empathy”, is currently taking place at Manchester University. 
7 These two sets of terms are used by neuroscientists Antonio Damasio (2001) and Gerald 
Edelman and Guidio Tononi (2000) to identify different levels of consciousness  
8 The term Release Techniques, which is not a dance style, refers to a form of dance movement 
that accentuates flow of weight and energy over shape and line. 
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Fig. 1. Digital imagery from Eros Eris (2007) 
Sarah Rubidge (Digital imagery), Liz Lea (Choreography)  
(Access this imagery on http://www.sensedigital.co.uk/EE4.htm ) 
 
When choreographers entered the domain of the digital in the mid-90s they brought with 
them a sensuality that was not particularly evident at that time in digital art practices9.  
Many choreographic artists became interested in the effect on viewers and participants 
of the qualitative features of digital imagery derived from dance movement. Amongst 
these were Thecla Schiphorst (BodyMap 1995-6), Gretchen Schiller and Susan Kozel 
(trajets 2000).10 
Much of the non-representational work created by choreographers for the digital domain 
uses relatively conventional choreographic devices to address the qualities of movement 
embodied in digital imagery. These include structuring devices such as canon, unison, 
mirroring, retrograde, and so on, and transformation of the qualitative aspects of motion, 
for example, modulation of spatial patterning and temporal factors, change of scale (all 
of which could be said to come under the umbrella of theme and variation). These 
choreographic devices, alongside more radical image processing techniques (see 
overleaf), are used extensively by digital choreographers as a means through which to 
generate an affective response to their imagery. 
                                                        
9   A notable exception is Paul Sermon’s Telematic Dreaming (1992) 





Fig. 2. Digital imagery from Eros, Eris (2007) 
 Sarah Rubidge (Digital imagery) 
(access via http://www.sensedigital.co.uk/EE1.htm) 
 
I noted earlier that we do not always pay attention to the nuances of sensations that 
underpin our waking life.  In the work mentioned earlier the artists are specifically 
interested in focusing the viewer and/or participant’s attention on the deeper levels of 
their engagement with, and ultimately understanding of, the world around them. Such 
works offer a prime example of the way in which we understand non-representational 
movement through the senses. 
An explanation for this has become increasingly evident in the work of a range of 
scientists, including neuroscientists Damasio (1999), Edelman (2000), Evan Thompson 
(2007) and biologist Steven Rose (2005). They indicate that the activities of the 
substrata of humans’ material bodies (from chemical and genetic codes, cells and tissue, 
flows of the nervous and circulatory systems to the activity of the neuronal networks) are 
hidden interfaces between human beings and their material and immaterial 
environments. The constant and autonomic activities of this ‘hidden’ body are the 
underpinnings of our affective life, of every encounter we have with the world (and by 
extension our encounters with art) and give rise to the embodied knowledge that 
underpins even our conceptual life  (Edelman, 2000; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).  
 
Fig. 3. Digital imagery from Hidden Histories (2001) 
by Sarah Rubidge and Joseph Hyde 
(access via http://www.sensedigital.co.uk/hh1.htm) 
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Many digital artists with a choreographic sensibility (for it is no longer the domain of the 
choreographer as works by digital artist Kirk Woolford attest11) appeal directly to this 
‘hidden’ body. Taking human movement as their starting point, they suggest through 
their imagery the flows of energy that betray the unseen motion that lies within the 
material world. This digital imagery is designed to be perceived by the viewer as much 
through the ‘kinaesthetic’ sense as through the visual sense. It frequently constitutes an 
interweaving of the abstract representations of rhythmic flows that articulate the 
intensities that lie within perceived motion rather than a realistic representation of its 
external appearance.  
This could serve to sensitise viewers to the more subtle flows of human movement that 
is prevalent in much of Steve Paxton’s, Rosemary Butcher’s and Siobhan Davies’s work. 
The sensations that we experience at this deeper level go beyond the sensations of the 
flesh. Rather, the residue of that sensation resonates in the material body of the viewer 
as the ‘thermometer of a becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p179).  Here we are 
dealing not with an overt experience of physical sensation, but with the altogether more 
liminal notion of affect. 
 
Fig. 4. Sample of digital imagery from Fugitive Moments (2006) 
by Sarah Rubidge, Beau Lotto and Erwan le Martelot  
(Access this imagery in motion on http://www.sensedigital.co.uk/FMIMovs.htm) 
 
Affect is described by Deleuze scholar Brian Massumi as  "a prepersonal intensity 
corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another" (see 
preface to Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.xvi). As such it is indeterminate, fleeting, barely 
felt before being momentarily superceded by yet another fleeting state.  These 
prepersonal experiential states, I suggest, are aligned with those deep body-states 
                                                        
11 www.bhaptic.net offers examples of Woolford’s works. 
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described by Damasio as ‘background emotions’ (calm, tension, well-being, dis-ease)12. 
I would further suggest that it is just such states that are generated by the very imagery 
whose meaning is not easily graspable by the conscious mind (reflective 
consciousness), and thus not easily articulated through words.  In this paper I will be 
focusing on this kind of digital imagery, imagery that has the ability to create affective 
resonances that “…intervene on the microscopic variations of a body’s biology, anatomy, 
movement and perception, while at the same time multiplying and re-mixing these 
variations” (Portanova, 2006)13, independent of ‘content’ or ‘meaning’. 
The experiential state embodied in the notion of affect is complex and indeterminate. It is 
aligned to the Deleuzian notion of intensities, whose behaviour is subject to constant 
variation and always implicated in other, parallel, intensities.  This interweaving of 
intensities results in the generation of an ever-variable ensemble of differential relations 
(Deleuze 1994).  This seems to me an apposite analogy for the workings of the human 
body, inasmuch as beneath the mass and volume of the flesh of our bodies lies a 
dynamic collection of interrelated systems of physiological flows, rhythms and intensities, 
each of which affects and is affected by the others. The state of ‘being’ in each of these 
systems is in a state of continuous variation, and transition that, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s terms  “…consists entirely of relations of movement and rest between 
molecules or particles, [and] capacities to affect and be affected” (my emphasis Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987, p.261).  Each change in one system impacts upon other systems to 
generate further variations and flows.  
As will be seen, it is this that gives rise to our sense of the nuances of motion, and thus 
to affect.  Thus, I would suggest, affect is a form of understanding that operates through 
the always active liminal perceptions in our bodies, and that many digital artists who 
exhibit a choreographic sensibility appeal directly to this substratum of our 
understanding.. It is here that the Deleuzian notion of ‘affect’14 begins to tally with current 
research by scientists such as Damasio (1999), Edelman (2000), Vittorio Gallese, 
Fransisco Varela (1992), Semir Zeki (1994) and Evan Thompson (2001/2007).  
These neuroscientists argue that the ‘subpersonal’ activity of the physiological and 
neuronal systems operating in parallel create networks of activity that give rise to both to 
our perceptions of and experience of our environment, whatever that environment might                                                         
12 Background emotion is distinguished from primary emotion (sadness, joy, disgust), secondary, 
and social, emotions (embarrassment, pride, jealousy) which, unlike background emotions, are 
the province of the autobiographical self. Background emotions are the province of what 
Damasio calls the prepersonal ’protoself’. 
13 This is as true of the visual digital imagery as it is of the sonic imagery she uses as her 
paradigm.    
14 Although strictly the notion was first made evident in the philosophy of Leibniz, Deleuze has 
reclaimed the concept for the contemporary world, which leads me to conceive of it as a 
Deleuzian notion. 
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be. These subliminal modes of perception respond to even indeterminate images 
experienced in art works (Freedberg and Gallese, 2006) and through bodily resonance 
become our embodied understanding of those works.  
 
Fig. 5. Sample of digital imagery from Fugitive Moments (2006) 
Sarah Rubidge, Beau Lotto and Erwan le Martelot  
Access this imagery in motion on http://www.sensedigital.co.uk/FMIMovs.htm  
This is an entirely proper mode of understanding of digital art works deriving from 
choreographic concepts. Phenomenologically our responses to the world are first and 
foremost experiential (lived experience). As well as seeing representations of ‘what’ it is 
out there we ‘feel’ what is out there. I would argue that in our engagements with non-
representational artworks it is as important to experience how the imagery feels to us, 
particularly those feelings that we cannot describe or even identify, as it is to know what 
it represents, particularly when viewing imagery such as that which I have been 
referencing.  
But what is so important about this in relation to the process of viewing non-
representational imagery? Neuroscientists such as Damasio and Edelman help to 
illuminate the nature of this mode of understanding by introducing structures of 
consciousness that include not merely reflective consciousness, which has long been 
the paradigm of consciousness in the West, but also the more sub-liminal levels of 
consciousness derived from the autonomic physiological systems. These they call ‘core’ 
consciousness (Damasio) and ‘primary’ consciousness (Edelman). This mode of 
consciousness generates the kind of understandings that are sometimes referred to as 
subconscious, unconscious or pre-conscious. That is, understandings that lie outside of 
the remit of reflective consciousness, and thus are beyond being understood through 
language, for they are often impossible to articulate satisfactorily in words. Bergson 
(1899, p.132) articulated this succinctly, noting that  "the word with well-defined outlines 
... overwhelms or at least covers up the delicate and fugitive impressions of our 
individual consciousness."  
But how do we understand at levels below those to which we have conscious (and thus 
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shareable) access?  Neuroscientists involved in Mirror Neuron research invoke notions 
of empathy, much as Martin did in 1939.  Their experiments have shown (Gallese et al 
1996) that humans respond in neuronal terms not only when they engage in an action 
(that is, when in an expressive mode15), but also when they observe someone/thing16 
engaged in that same action (that is, when in a receptive mode). This response is 
particularly evident if the observer has previously had direct physical experience of 
engaging in the action.  
This last claim has been born out in a context particularly relevant to this paper by 
experiments undertaken by a group of neuroscientists from the University of London 
(Beatrice Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). Using an fMRI scanner they measured the 
responses of two experienced dancers, one a capoeira dancer, the other a ballet dancer, 
to two video clips of choreographed dance movement, a ballet sequence and a capoeira 
sequence17. The experiments revealed that the neuronal activity in the Mirror Neuron 
System when in receptive modewas greater in the brain of a capoeira dancer when 
watching capoeira dance than when watching ballet. The opposite obtained when the 
subject was a ballet dancer, for whom the ballet sequence generated the strongest 
response in the Mirror Neuron System in receptive mode. This supports the claims of 
researchers at the University of Parma. These researchers (of whom the most prolific is 
perhaps Vittorio Gallese) argue that the brain generates an embodied simulation of 
certain human motions when perceiving motions similar to those one has had 
experience of performing. I suspect that this could be of particular relevance to the 
process of developing an intuitive understanding of apparently non-representational 
kinetic digital imagery grounded in human movement. Indeed, experiments with 
biological motion indicate that we have then ability to recognise human motion from the 
most minimal of motion clues18.  
Later, neuroscientists began to speculate that the Mirror Neuron System activates 
intersubjective understanding, or empathy, for it seems to enable us to anticipate others’ 
intentions ‘intuitively’ (Fogessi et al, 1998; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Gallese, et al. 
2001), and thus to predict or anticipate their subsequent actions.                                                          
15 The Mirror Neuron System has two operational modes, expressive (when the organism is 
enacting a movement) and receptive (when an organism is observing someone/thing else 
engaged in a movement) 
16 As artistic works using industrial robots attest (see Motionhouse’s Digger Dance from The Edge 
(2004) http://www.motionhouse.co.uk/wtcflm.htm#; Devolution (2006) Garry Stewart, Australian 
Dance Theatre) http://www.realtimearts.net/article/issue72/8089) 
17 The movements in each video clip were matched up as far as possible in spatio-temporal terms 
by a dancer/choreographer according to criteria of: speed, part of the body employed, body 
location in space, direction of body movement. 
18 Scientists offer some support for this notion though their experiments with biological motion, 
whereby the reduction of a motion captured image of a person walking to a series of dots were 
recognised as such by subjects. (Initiated by G.Johanssen in 1973, the study of biological 
motion continues to attract the interests of psychophysicists such as Kourtsi Z, 1999; Thornton 
et al. 2003.) 
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Fig. 6. Semi-representational Imagery from Hidden Histories (2001) 
Sarah Rubidge and Joseph Hyde 
(Access this imagery in motion on http://www.sensedigital.co.uk/HH1.htm) 
 
The fact that the Mirror Neuron System is more active when subjects have direct 
experience of an observed activity indicates that such predictions might be less accurate 
if subjects do not have experience of the action, as they have no basis upon which to 
build an embodied simulation, and thus a basis for prediction.   
 
It is interesting in the context of this conference to note that neuroscientists such as 
Gallese, Zeki and Calvo-Merino et al are beginning to extend their field of study from 
functional movement to artistic representations of human movement (Zeki, 1994 and 
1998, Freedburg and Gallese 2006, Calvo-Merino et al., 2008).  Of equal interest is that 
the scientists specifically acknowledge that, whilst neuronal activity is a necessary 
condition of the artistic experience, it is not sufficient condition, the latter also requiring a 
phenomenological dimension. They thus acknowledge that art is a complex entity that 
can be subjected to any number of analytic strategies, from the purely scientific to those 
with their grounding in non-scientific fields. They also recognise that, whilst 
measurement of neurons when subjects are observing artistic imagery gives certain 
important information it is not sufficient evidence upon which to build a claim concerning 
human responses to art involving movement.  
 
These scientists do not confine themselves to the scientific domain in their studies, 
however. Indeed, on the grounds that the ‘lived body’ is the constitute foundation of any 
perception, many invoke phenomenologists such as Merleau Ponty to underpin  their 
arguments (Gallese, 2001, 2005, 2007; Evan Thompson, 2001 and 2007; Francisco 
Varela, 1992). Gallese in particular drew the threads of the scientific and the 
phenomenological together when he posited a process called the Shared Manifold of 
Intersubjectivity (Gallese 2001). This process, he argues, incorporates both a 
physiological and a phenomenological level. The Shared Manifold of Intersubjectivity is 
closely aligned to Martin’s notion of metakinesis and kinaesthetic empathy. Indeed, this 
theory could explain how we glean an affective response to movement, whether live or 
digital, artistic or functional, and from there begin to understand the kind of non-
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representational digital imagery that I refer to in this paper. By extension, it might also 
explain how such imagery might engender an aesthetic experience that is related to the 
states of being that we experience as human beings when observing human motion 
(Freedberg and Gallese, 2007). The former certainly seems to involve experiencing 
similar body-states to those when we experience emotion, whether background, 
personal or social19.  
Gallese posits that there are three levels in the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. As 
an integrated system, each level of activity interacts with the other levels, but can be 
analysed separately. The first is the sub-personal level – the neurophysiological domain 
which is examined through experiments that are concerned with the activity of the brain. 
The results of these experiments have given rise to neuroscientific explanations of, and 
speculations concerning, human behaviour and modes of understanding.  The second is 
the functional level – the domain of the (embodied) simulation routines that take place in 
the brain. These enable internal representations of body-states previously experienced 
when the individual was in motion to be generated in the brain through the activation of 
the mirror neuron system as s/he observes an action. The third is the phenomenological 
level – at which intersubjective empathy comes into play. Here they argue, as a result of 
embodied simulation, we experience similar sensations and background ‘emotions’  to 
those with whom we interact, and find that the actions of others become meaningful to 
us at a pre-linguistic level20. In non-representational digital imagery only traces of the 
human motion that gives rise to these body states remain, yet it seems that when 
viewing it we can feel something similar to that which we have experienced when 
viewing live human movement. 
Of interest in the context of this paper, another neurological mechanism, which allows a 
dialogue between visual and kinetic experiences to take place, is also brought into play 
when we observe movement. We possess a visuo-association cortex which is involved 
in advanced multisensory and sensorimotor integration as we respond to our 
experiences (Zeki and Lamb, 1994). Our perception is therefore physiologically 
multimodal, the somatosensory cortex and the dorsal stream of the visual system, and 
with it the ventral stream21, being integrated in the parietal lobe (Gallese, 2005).  All this                                                         
19 Damasio makes a clear distinction between feelings and emotions: in his 
taxomony an emotion is the autonomic reaction to a stimulus, a feeling is a 
perception of the body-state generated by such reactions. As such, in 
Damasio’s terms emotions are the fundamental mechanism for the regulation 
of life, and are the foundations for feelings, whereas feelings are more akin to 
the popular understanding of emotion. It is the former to which I refer here. 
20 Crucially, all levels of the shared manifold are interdependent, there being a strict coupling 
between the activities of the affective and sensorimotor neural systems in any experience 
(Gallese, 2001. p. 46) 
21 The dorsal stream is the ‘where‘ or ‘how’  stream, and is believed to be involved in the 
guidance of actions and recognizing where objects are in space. The ventral stream is the 
’what’ stream, and is associated with object recognition and form representation.  The two are 
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leads to the establishment of a multimodal cortical network. One could therefore surmise 
that the processes involved in these cortical systems facilitate physiological connections 
between what is ‘seen’, what is experienced and what is ‘known’, even when viewing 
images that are non-representational. As such this cortical network might very well affect 
our ability to non-consciously make connections primarily kinetic and visual stimuli when 
watching the kind of non-representational digital imagery discussed in this paper22.  
I would suggest that both these processes, and the intersubjective understanding of 
movement at a neuronal level, could underlie our intuitive responses to non-
representational kinetic digital imagery that is grounded in human movement.  This is 
supported by David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese (2007), who argue that an important 
element of our aesthetic response to art that in some way involves the representation of 
movement consists of an activation of embodied stimulations mechanisms that simulate 
not only actions, but also the implied actions, emotions and/or corporeal sensations 
articulated in an art work. Significantly they suggest that embodied simulation is 
activated not only, as would be expected, by figurative imagery, but also by non-
figurative contemporary art, arguing that 
“….the relationship between embodied empathetic feelings [simulations] in the 
observer and the quality of the work forms a substantial part of the experience 
of [this type of] artwork.” (p. 199). 
 
Even when there is no narrative or overt emotional content in an art work, a bodily 
resonance, or empathetic reaction, can arise through a bodily resonance with the implied 
movements embedded in the physical traces of non-representational kinetic imagery 
(Freeberg and Gallese 2006).  
I would argue that the studies undertaken by neuroscientists into neuronal responses to 
moving imagery allow us to reclaim Martin’s notion of kinaesthetic empathy, by helping 
us to understand the mechanisms that allow us apparently to experience a sense of 
corporeal empathy when we view both non-representational dance imagery and kinetic 
non-representational digital imagery that reveals the ‘sensible essence’ of its human 
source material. Indeed, kinetic images such as these, being grounded in human 
movement behaviours, could very well generate an embodied simulation in those 
familiar with the shaping and qualities of the implicit source of the motion (dance 
movement grounded in what now tend to be referred to as somatic practices), and thus 
engender an embodied understanding of the flow of human movement implied in the 
non-representational digital imagery.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
interconnected. It is notable that the ventral stream goes into the temporal lobe, which contains 
the center for smell, and some association areas for memory and learning 
22  Moving examples of much of this imagery can be found on www.sensedigital.co.uk, specifically 
on the  pages that refer to global drifts, Fugitive Moments and Eros Eris. 
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As such, I would suggest that we intuitively understand the implicit emotional states and 
‘meanings’ embodied both in non-representational dances and in non-representational 
digital imagery through an embodied cognition which has its roots in part in the activity of 
the Mirror Neuron System.  
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